Many states either expressly provide for or otherwise acknowledge foster parent right to intervention. In many cases, this right is contingent upon the longevity of the child’s time in foster care and the relationship that has developed between child and foster parent over that period. For example,
- Colorado provides intervention as of right for foster parents who have cared for the child for more than three (3) months. Col. Rev. Stat. § 19-5-507(5)(a);
- Kentucky provides intervention as of right for foster parents who have cared for the child for more than six (6) months. KY Rev. Stat. § 625.060;
- New York provides intervention as of right for foster parents who have cared for the child for more than twelve (12) months. N.Y. Cons. Laws, Soc. Serv. Law § 383(3).
While Alabama law does not presently provide a similar measured timeframe, the same underlying legal principles are present. Notably, Alabama law provides a twelve (12) month presumptively reasonable timeframe for foster care, clearly stating that the child’s bond with his foster parent(s) should be considered by the court.
Likewise, DHR is mandated to petition for termination of parental rights when a child has been in foster care for twelve (12) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months. Ala. Code § 12-15-317(1); see also federal regulation in 42 U.S. Code § 675(5)(E).
The juvenile court should consider the child’s bond with his foster parent(s), under Ala. Code § 12-15-319(a)(13). Factors in that consideration include “the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment” and “whether severing the ties between the child and his or her current foster parent or parents is contrary to the best interest of the child.” Id.
The presumptively reasonable time for a child to remain in foster care is 12 months. L.M.W. v. Etowah Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 55 So.3d 1204, 1214 (Ala.Civ.App. 2010); M.A.J. v. S.F., 994 So.2d 280, 291 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
“There is little that can be as detrimental to a child’s sound development as uncertainty over whether he is to remain in his current ‘home’ … especially when such uncertainty is prolonged.” Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513–14 (1982).
At some point, a denial of the foster parent’s intervention would be prejudicial to the interests of the child as a third party to the proceedings. Ex parte M.J.W., 62 So. 3d 531, 536 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (children are third parties to dependency actions, with substantial interests that must be protected by the court).
Foster Parent Intervention, As of Right
